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Abstract
In the standard approach to quantum games, players’ moves are local unitary transforma-
tions on an entangled state that is subsequently measured. Players’ payoffs are then obtained
as expected values of the entries in the payoff matrix of the classical game on a set of quantum
probabilities obtained from the quantum measurement. In this paper, we approach quantum
games from a diametrically opposite perspective. We consider a classical three-player sym-
metric game along with a known expression for a set of quantum probabilities relevant to a
tripartite Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment that depends on three players’ direc-
tional choices in the experiment. We define the players’ moves as their directional choices in an
EPR setting and then express their payoff relations in the resulting quantum game in terms
of their directional choices, the entries of the payoff matrix, and the quantum probability
distribution relevant to the tripartite EPR experiment.
1 Introduction
In the standard scheme [1, 2] of a quantized version of a non-cooperative game [3], the players
share an entangled state, their strategic moves are local unitary transformations on the state,
and the quantum measurement [4] generates the players’ payoffs. The resulting players’ payoffs
in the quantum game can be understood as the expected values of the entries in the payoff
matrix of the (classical) game [5–7] arising from a set of quantum probabilities [4]. The key
concerns in determining the players’ payoffs relations in the quantum game are a) What are
the players’ moves in the quantum game? b) Which set of quantum probabilities is obtained by
quantum measurement? and c) How the players’ strategic moves are related to the set of quantum
probabilities?
This brings us to question whether the unitary transformations are really necessary in the setup
of a quantum game. A proposed scheme [8–10,12] for playing a quantum game in which players’
strategic moves are not unitary transformations uses the setting of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) experiment [4, 14–18]. Two players are located in spacelike-separated regions and share a
singlet state. In a run of the experiment, each player decides one out of the two available directions
and a quantum measurement is performed. This leads to obtaining a (normalized) set of quantum
probabilities along with a listing of the directional choices the players make in each run of the
experiment. As the players’ directional choices determine the quantum probability distribution,
the setting can be used to develop a quantum version of a two-player game. A multipartite EPR
experiment would then be required for a multiplayer quantum game.
In this paper, we consider a classical three-player symmetric game, along with a reported
expression for a quantum probability distribution, which is relevant to the three-partite EPR
experiment. We then define players’ directional choices in the experiment as their strategic moves
and express players’ payoff relations in the quantum game in terms of the three directional choices
and the entries of the payoff matrix.
This paper thus provides a game-theoretic perspective on the peculiarity of quantum prob-
abilities. The first perspective along game-theoretical lines on quantum probabilities that are
associated to the GHZ state [4] was provided by Vaidman in Ref. [19]. Vaidman proposed a set
of rules defining a game that can only be won by a team of three players when they share a GHZ
state. The present paper extends Vaidman’s perspective by considering Nash equilibria in the set
of symmetric games played by a team of three players in a non-cooperative game setting. Vaidman
presented his game without invoking Hilbert space as is the case in the present paper.
2 Three-player games with mixed-strategies
Consider a three-player (noncooperative) game in which the players Alice (A), Bob (B), and Chris
(C) make their strategic moves simultaneously. The players are assumed located at distance and
are unable to communicate to one another. They, however, can communicate to a referee who
organizes the game and ensures that the rules of the game are obeyed. Each player has to decide
between two choices, called the pure strategies, and in repeated version of the game they can also
play the mixed strategies. Their payoff relations are made public by the referee at the start of
the game. The payoff relations depend on the game matrix, the players’ pure strategies, and the
probability distribution on pure strategies.
To be specific, we assume that the player A’s pure strategies are S1, S2; the player B’s pure
strategies are S′
1
, S′
2
; and the player C’s pure strategies are S′′
1
, S′′
2
. Also, the game is defined by
the following pure-strategy payoff relations [21]
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) = α1, β1, γ1;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) = α2, β2, γ2;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = α3, β3, γ3;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) = α4, β4, γ4;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2
, S′′
2
) = α5, β5, γ5;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) = α6, β6, γ6;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = α7, β7, γ7;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2
, S′′
2
) = α8, β8, γ8.
(1)
For example, ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = α3, β3, γ3 states that the players A, B, and C obtain the
payoffs α3, β3, and γ3, respectively, when they play the pure strategies S1, S
′
2
, and S′′
1
, respectively.
In a repeated version of this game, a player can choose between his/her two pure strategies
with some probability, which defines his/her mixed-strategy. We specify a mixed-strategy by x,
y, z ∈ [0, 1] for players A, B, and C, respectively. These are the probabilities with which the
players A, B, and C play the pure strategies S1, S
′
1
, and S′′
1
, respectively. They, then, play the
pure strategies S2, S
′
2, and S
′′
2 with probabilities (1 − x), (1 − y), and (1 − z), respectively, and
the mixed-strategy payoff relations, therefore, read
ΠA,B,C(x, y, z) = xyzΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) + x(1 − y)zΠA,B,C(S1, S′2, S′′1 )+
xy(1 − z)ΠA,B,C(S1, S′1, S′′2 ) + x(1 − y)(1− z)ΠA,B,C(S1, S′2, S′′2 )+
(1− x)yzΠA,B,C(S2, S′1, S′′1 ) + (1− x)(1 − y)zΠA,B,C(S2, S′2, S′′1 )+
(1− x)y(1 − z)ΠA,B,C(S2, S′1, S′′2 ) + (1 − x)(1 − y)(1− z)ΠA,B,C(S2, S′2, S′′2 ),
(2)
that can also be written as
ΠA,B,C(x, y, z) =
∑
i,j,k=1,2
Prc(Si, S
′
j , S
′′
k )ΠA,B,C(Si, S
′
j , S
′′
k ), (3)
where Prc(Si, S
′
j , S
′′
k ) are the classical factorizable probabilities and for instance, Prc(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) =
xy(1− z) and Prc(S2, S′2, S′′1 ) = (1 − x)(1 − y)z.
2.1 Symmetric three-player games
Symmetric three-player games are defined by the condition that a player’s payoff is decided by
his/her strategic move and not by his/her identity. Mathematically, this is expressed by the
conditions
ΠA(x, y, z) = ΠA(x, z, y) = ΠB(y, x, z) = ΠB(z, x, y) = ΠC(y, z, x) = ΠC(z, y, x), (4)
i.e. the player A’s payoff when s/he plays x remains the same either when player B plays y
whereas player C plays y or when player B plays x whereas player C play x. The payoff relations
(2) satisfy the conditions (4) when [21]
β
1
= α1, β2 = α3, β3 = α2, β4 = α3,
β5 = α6, β6 = α5, β7 = α6, β8 = α8,
γ1 = α1, γ2 = α3, γ3 = α3, γ4 = α2,
γ
5
= α6, γ6 = α6, γ7 = α5, γ8 = α8,
α6 = α7, α3 = α4.
(5)
A symmetric three-player game can, therefore, be defined by only six constants α1, α2, α3, α5,
α6, and α8. In the rest of this paper we will define these six constants to be α, β, δ, ǫ, θ, and ω,
where α1 = α, α2 = β, α3 = δ, α5 = ǫ, α6 = θ, and α8 = ω. The pure-strategy payoff relations
(1) in this symmetric game are then re-expressed as
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) = α, α, α;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = β, δ, δ;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = δ, β, δ;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) = δ, δ, β;
ΠA,B,C(S1, S
′
2
, S′′
2
) = ǫ, θ, θ;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = θ, ǫ, θ;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
1 ) = θ, θ, ǫ;
ΠA,B,C(S2, S
′
2
, S′′
2
) = ω, ω, ω.
(6)
The mixed-strategy payoff relations in Eq. (2) then take the form
ΠA,B,C(x, y, z) = xyz(α, α, α) + x(1 − y)z(δ, β, δ) + xy(1− z)(δ, δ, β)+
x(1 − y)(1− z)(ǫ, θ, θ) + (1− x)yz(β, δ, δ) + (1− x)(1 − y)z(θ, θ, ǫ)+
(1− x)y(1 − z)(θ, ǫ, θ) + (1− x)(1 − y)(1− z)(ω, ω, ω).
(7)
3 Quantum probability distribution for a GHZ state
Consider the GHZ state
|ψ〉 = (|0〉
1
|0〉
2
|0〉
3
+ |1〉
1
|1〉
2
|1〉
3
)/
√
2, (8)
that is shared among three the three players, where |i〉j is the i-th state of the j-th qubit and the
setting of the generalized EPR experiments. Each player measures the dichotomic observable ~n.~σ
where ~n = ~a,~b,~c and ~σ is a vector the components of which are standard Pauli matrices. The
family of observables ~n.~σ covers all possible dichotomic observables for a qubit system [4].
Kaszlikowski and Z˙ukowski [20] show that the probability of obtaining the result m = ±1 for
the player A, when s/he plays the strategy ~a, the result l = ±1 for the player B, when s/he plays
the strategy ~b and the result k = ±1 for the player C, when s/he plays the strategy ~c is given by
Pr
QM
(m, l, k;~a,~b,~c) =
1
8
[
1 +mla3b3 +mka3c3 + lkb3c3 +mlk
3∑
r,p,s=1
Mrpsarbpcs
]
, (9)
where ar, bp, cs are components of vectors ~a,~b,~c and where nonzero elements of the tensor Mrps
are M111 = 1, M122 = −1, M212 = −1, M221 = −1. In view of this, the only terms in the product
arbpcs that contribute towards the probability PrQM (m, l, k;~a,~b,~c) are a1b1c1, a1b2c2, a2b1c2, and
a2b2c1. Eq. (9) can therefore be written as
Pr
QM
(m, l, k;~a,~b,~c) =
1
8
[1 +mla3b3 +mka3c3 + lkb3c3 +mlk(a1b1c1 − a1b2c2 − a2b1c2 − a2b2c1)] .
(10)
Note that Eq. (9) gives a quantum probability distribution without reference to the undelying
Hilbert space, unitary transformations, or quantum measurement.
We consider playing a three-player quantum game in which the players Alice, Bob, and Chris
(henceforth, labelled as player A, player B, and player C) moves consist of choosing the directions
~a,~b, and ~c, respectively. The players’s payoff relations are then expressed in terms of the quantum
probability distribution given in Eq. (9).
3.1 Players sharing a GHZ state and when choosing a direction is a
player’s move
Let ~a = ~a(a1, a2, a3), ~b = ~b(b1, b2, b3), ~c = ~c(c1, c2, c3) be the players’ directional choices that
we consider as their strategies. Denoting the quantum probabilities by PrQ, the set of quantum
probabilities can be obtained from Eq. (10) as follows
Pr
Q
(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = +1), (~b, l = +1), (~c, k = +1)]
=
1
8
[1 + a3b3 + a3c3 + b3c3 +∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S1, S
′
2
, S′′
1
) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = +1), (~b, l = −1), (~c, k = +1)]
=
1
8
[1− a3b3 + a3c3 − b3c3 −∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = +1), (~b, l = +1), (~c, k = −1)]
=
1
8
[1 + a3b3 − a3c3 − b3c3 −∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S1, S
′
2
, S′′
2
) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = +1), (~b, l = −1), (~c, k = −1)]
=
1
8
[1− a3b3 − a3c3 + b3c3 +∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = −1), (~b, l = +1), (~c, k = +1)]
=
1
8
[1− a3b3 − a3c3 + b3c3 −∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S2, S
′
2
, S′′
1
) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = −1), (~b, l = −1), (~c, k = +1)]
=
1
8
[1 + a3b3 − a3c3 − b3c3 +∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S2, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = −1), (~b, l = +1), (~c, k = −1)]
=
1
8
[1− a3b3 + a3c3 − b3c3 +∆] ;
Pr
Q
(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) = Pr
Q
[(~a,m = −1), (~b, l = −1), (~c, k = −1)]
=
1
8
[1 + a3b3 + a3c3 + b3c3 −∆] ; (11)
where ∆ = a1b1c1 − a1b2c2 − a2b1c2 − a2b2c1. We define players A’s, B’s, C’s payoff relations in
the quantum game as follows
ΠA,B,C(~a,~b,~c) =
∑2
i,j,k=1 PrQ(Si, S
′
j, S
′′
k )ΠA,B,C(Si, S
′
j , S
′′
k ), (12)
i.e. these are obtained as the expectation of payoff entries (6) on the set of quantum probabilities
(11). For the symmetric game defined in Eq. (6), the payoffs to the players A, B, and C, given in
(12), can then be expanded as follows:
ΠA,B,C(~a,~b,~c) =
1
8
{[1 + a3b3 + a3c3 + b3c3 +∆] (α, α, α) + [1− a3b3 + a3c3 − b3c3 −∆] (δ, β, δ)+
[1 + a3b3 − a3c3 − b3c3 −∆] (δ, δ, β) + [1− a3b3 − a3c3 + b3c3 +∆] (ǫ, θ, θ)+
[1− a3b3 − a3c3 + b3c3 −∆] (β, δ, δ) + [1 + a3b3 − a3c3 − b3c3 +∆] (θ, θ, ǫ)+
[1− a3b3 + a3c3 − b3c3 +∆] (θ, ǫ, θ) + [1 + a3b3 + a3c3 + b3c3 −∆] (ω, ω, ω)}.
(13)
Let a3 = b3 = c3 = 0 i.e. when the players’ unit vectors are confined to the X-Y plane, the payoff
relations (13) can be written as
ΠA,B,C(~a,~b,~c) =
1
8
{(1 + ∆)(α, α, α) + (1−∆)(δ, β, δ) + (1−∆)(δ, δ, β) + (1 + ∆)(ǫ, θ, θ)+
(1 −∆)(β, δ, δ) + (1 + ∆)(θ, θ, ǫ) + (1 + ∆)(θ, ǫ, θ) + (1−∆)(ω, ω, ω)}.
(14)
It is apparent from above that the resulting payoff relations (14) in the quantum game cannot be
put into a form that is same as for the classical mixed-strategy game i.e. Eq. (7). This raises the
question whether there exist constraints that can be placed on the players’ directional choices, i.e.
the unit vectors ~a, ~b, and ~c, such that the payoff relations (13) in the quantum game are reduced
to the players’ payoffs in the classical game allowing mixed strategies (7). In order to find an
answer to this we set
ΠA,B,C(~a,~b,~c) = ΠA,B,C(x, y, z), (15)
and equate the right sides of Eqs. (13, 7) i.e.
1
8
[1 + a3b3 + a3c3 + b3c3 +∆] = xyz, (16)
1
8
[1− a3b3 + a3c3 − b3c3 −∆] = x(1 − y)z, (17)
1
8
[1 + a3b3 − a3c3 − b3c3 −∆] = xy(1− z), (18)
1
8
[1− a3b3 − a3c3 + b3c3 +∆] = x(1 − y)(1− z), (19)
1
8
[1− a3b3 − a3c3 + b3c3 −∆] = (1− x)yz, (20)
1
8
[1 + a3b3 − a3c3 − b3c3 +∆] = (1− x)(1 − y)z, (21)
1
8
[1− a3b3 + a3c3 − b3c3 +∆] = (1− x)y(1 − z), (22)
1
8
[1 + a3b3 + a3c3 + b3c3 −∆] = (1− x)(1 − y(1− z). (23)
Now, by adding Eqs. (16) and (17) we obtain
1
4
(1 + a3c3) = xz, (24)
adding Eqs. (16) and (18) gives
1
4
(1 + a3b3) = xy, (25)
adding Eqs. (16) and (20) gives
1
4
(1 + b3c3) = yz, (26)
adding Eqs. (18) and (19) gives
1
4
(1 − a3c3) = x(1 − z). (27)
Now, we add Eqs. (24) and (27) to obtain x = 1
2
. Adding Eqs. (22) and (23) gives
1
4
(1 + a3c3) = (1− x)(1 − z), (28)
and substitution from Eq. (24) and x = 1
2
gives z = 1
2
. Similarly, adding Eqs. (17) and (19) gives
14
(1− a3b3) = x(1 − y), (29)
and adding Eqs. (21) and (23) gives
1
4
(1 + a3b3) = (1− x)(1 − y). (30)
By adding Eqs. (29) and (30) we obtain y = 1
2
and thus (x, y, z) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
) is obtained as the
solution of the Eqs. (16) to (23).
Therefore, the mixed-strategy payoff relations (7) can be recovered from the payoffs relations
(13) for the quantum game only for the special case when (x, y, z) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
). This is because
the quantum probability distribution for the GHZ state, from which the payoff relations (13) are
constructed, are inherently non-factorizable. In the research area of quantum games, recovering
the mixed strategy classical payoff relations from the payoff relations for a quantum game is
quite often considered an essential requirement. When the underlying quantum probabilities in
a quantum game are obtained from the GHZ state, this requirement is not satisfied except for a
very special case, i.e. (x, y, z) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
).
Considering the payoff relations (13) in the quantum game, a Nash equilibrium (NE) is a
directional triple (~a∗,~b∗,~c∗) that satisfies the following constraints:
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a,~b∗,~c∗) ≥ 0,
ΠB(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠB(~a∗,~b,~c∗) ≥ 0,
ΠC(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠC(~a∗,~b∗,~c) ≥ 0, (31)
for all ~a, ~b, and ~c. For the symmetric game, these Nash inequalities take the form
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a,~b∗,~c∗) = 1
8
[(a∗3 − a3)∆1γ1 + γ2(a∗1 − a1)∆2 − γ2(a∗2 − a2)∆3] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b,~c∗) = 1
8
[(b∗3 − b3)∆′1γ1 − γ2(b∗2 − b2)∆′2 + γ2(b∗1 − b1)∆′3] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b∗,~c) = 1
8
[(c∗3 − c3)∆′′1γ1 − γ2(c∗2 − c2)∆′′2 + γ2(c∗1 − c1)∆′′3 ] ≥ 0,
(32)
where
γ1 = α− β − ǫ + ω and γ2 = α− 2δ − β + ǫ+ 2θ − ω, (33)
and
∆1 = b3 + c3, ∆2 = b1c1 − b2c2, ∆3 = b1c2 + b2c1,
∆′
1
= a3 + c3, ∆
′
2
= a1c2 + a2c1, ∆
′
3
= a1c1 − a2c2,
∆′′1 = a3 + b3, ∆
′′
2 = a1b2 + a2b1, ∆
′′
3 = a1b1 − a2b2. (34)
3.2 Three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a noncooperative game [5–7] that is widely known in the areas of
economics, social, and political sciences. In recent years, quantum physics has been added to this
list. It was investigated early in the history of quantum games and provided significant motivation
for further work in this area.
Two-player PD is about two suspects, considered here as the players in a game, who have
been arrested on the allegations of having committed a crime but there not not enough available
evidence to convict them. The investigators come up with an ingenious plan to make the suspects
confess their crime.
They are taken to separate cells and are not allowed to communicate. They are contacted
individually and, along with being dictated a set of rules, are asked to choose between two choices
(strategies): to Confess (D) and Not to Confess (C), where C and D stand for Cooperation and
Defection. These are the well-known wordings for the available choices for them and refer to the
choice they make to the fellow prisoner, and not to the authorities.
The rules state that if neither prisoner confesses, i.e. (C,C), both are given freedom; when one
prisoner confesses (D) and the other does not (C), i.e. (C,D) or (D,C), the prisoner who confesses
(D) gets freedom as well as a financial reward, while the prisoner who did not confess ends up in
prison for a longer term. If both prisoners confess, i.e. (D,D), both are given a reduced term.
In the two-player case, involving the players A and B the strategy pair (D,D) comes out as
the unique NE (and the rational outcome) of the game, leading to the situation of both ending up
in jail with reduced term. The game offers a dilemma as the rational outcome (D,D) differs from
the outcome (C,C), which is an available choice, and for which both prisoners obtain freedom.
With the above notation, the three-player PD can be defined by making the following associ-
ations
S1 ∼ C, S2 ∼ D, S′1 ∼ C, S′2 ∼ D, S′′1 ∼ C, S′′2 ∼ D, (35)
and afterwards imposing the following conditions [22]:
a) The strategy S2 is a dominant choice [6] for each player. For Alice this requires
ΠA(S2, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) > ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
),
ΠA(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S1, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
ΠA(S2, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) > ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
2
),
(36)
and similar inequalities hold for players Bob and Chris.
b) A player is better off if more of his/her opponents choose to cooperate. For Alice this
requires
ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
1 ) > ΠA(S2, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > ΠA(S2, S
′
2, S
′′
2 ),
ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) > ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) > ΠA(S1, S
′
2
, S′′
2
),
(37)
and similar relations hold for Bob and Chris.
c) If one player’s choice is fixed, the other two players are left in the situation of a two-player
PD. For Alice this requires
ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
2
) > ΠA(S2, S
′
2
, S′′
2
),
ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) > ΠA(S2, S
′
1
, S′′
2
),
ΠA(S1, S
′
1, S
′′
2 ) > (1/2) {ΠA(S1, S′2, S′′2 ) + ΠA(S2, S′1, S′′2 )} ,
ΠA(S1, S
′
1
, S′′
1
) > (1/2) {ΠA(S1, S′1, S′′2 ) + ΠA(S2, S′1, S′′1 )} ,
(38)
and similar relations hold for Bob and Chris.
Translating the above conditions while using the notation introduced in (6) requires
a) β > α, ω > ǫ, θ > δ,
b) β > θ > ω, α > δ > ǫ,
c) δ > ω, α > θ, δ > (1/2)(ǫ+ θ), α > (1/2)(δ + β),
(39)
which defines the generalized three-player PD. For example [22], by letting
α = 7, β = 9, δ = 3, ǫ = 0, ω = 1, θ = 5, (40)
all of these conditions hold.
4 Three-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma with GHZ state
The values in (40) give γ
1
= −1 and γ
2
= 1. With the deltas given in (34), the Nash inequalities
(32) take the form
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a,~b∗,~c∗) =
1
8
[−(a∗
3
− a3)(b3 + c3) + (a∗1 − a1)(b1c1 − b2c2)− (a∗2 − a2)(b1c2 + b2c1)] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b,~c∗) =
1
8
[−(b∗
3
− b3)(a3 + c3)− (b∗2 − b2)(a1c2 + a2c1) + (b∗1 − b1)(a1c1 − a2c2)] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b∗,~c) =
1
8
[−(c∗
3
− c3)(a3 + b3)− (c∗2 − c2)(a1b2 + a2b1) + (c∗1 − c1)(a1b1 − a2b2)] ≥ 0.
(41)
These inequalities show that for the PD game defined in (40), no directional triplet can exist
as a NE when the three players have the choice to direct their respective unit vector along any
direction i.e. there are no restrictions placed on the players’ directional choices.
The inequalities (32) suggest the following cases:
4.1 Case (a)
Consider a3 = b3 = c3 = 0. Nash inequalities (32) then take the form
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a,~b∗,~c∗) = 1
8
γ2 [(a
∗
1
− a1)∆2 − (a∗2 − a2)∆3] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b,~c∗) = 1
8
γ2 [−(b∗2 − b2)∆′2 + (b∗1 − b1)∆′3] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b∗,~c) = 1
8
γ2 [−(c∗2 − c2)∆′′2 + (c∗1 − c1)∆′′3 ] ≥ 0,
(42)
that can also be expressed as
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a,~b∗,~c∗) = 1
8
γ
2
[a∗
1
∆2 − a∗2∆3 + ς] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b,~c∗) = 1
8
γ
2
[−b∗
2
∆′
2
+ b∗
1
∆′
3
+ ς ] ≥ 0,
ΠA(~a
∗,~b∗,~c∗)−ΠA(~a∗,~b∗,~c) = 1
8
γ2 [−c∗2∆′′2 + c∗1∆′′3 + ς] ≥ 0, (43)
where
ς = a1b2c2 + a2b1c2 − a1b1c1 + a2b2c1. (44)
Consider the case when γ2 > 0, then for given a
∗
1, b
∗
1, and c
∗
1, the restrictions on the directions
that the unit vectors ~a, ~b, and ~c can take can be determined. For instance, for a∗2,= b
∗
1,= c
∗
1 = 1,
i.e. then a∗2 = b
∗
2 = c
∗
2 = 0,these constraints become
∆2 + ς ≥ 0, ∆′3 + ς ≥ 0, ∆′′3 + ς ≥ 0. (45)
4.2 Case (b)
Consider γ2 = 0 and a3 = b3 = c3 = 0. With these constraints, the allowed directions are confined
to the X-Y plane and any directional triplet then exists as a NE. In this case, from Eqs. (34) we
then have ∆1 = ∆
′
1 = ∆
′′
1 = 0. As ~a,
~b, and ~c are unit vectors, we also have a2 = ±
√
1− a2
1
,
b2 = ±
√
1− b2
1
, and c2 = ±
√
1− c2
1
.
5 Discussion
We present an analysis of the three-partite EPR experiments that use a GHZ state and is consid-
ered as a three-player non-cooperative quantum game. The players’ strategic choices are the three
directions ~a, ~b, and ~c along which the dichotomic observables ~n.~σ are measured, where ~n = ~a,~b,~c
and ~σ is a vector whose components are the standard Pauli matrices. Using Kaszlikowski and
Z˙ukowski’s results [20] for the quantum probabilities involved in such experiments, we develop a
three-player quantum game, with the underlying three-partite EPR experiment. This extends
an approach to quantum games by Vaidman [19] that does not involve Hilbert space, and/or
quantum measurement, and shows how three-player quantum games with EPR experiments can
be developed. Players’ strategies are their directions in terms of which their payoffs are expressed
using Eq. (10). Nash inequalities are used to obtain Nash equilibria as direction triples and the
players’ payoffs are then compared to their payoffs for the Nash equilibria in the classical game.
For a three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma game, defined in (40), we conclude that no directional
triplet can exist as a NE when no restrictions are placed on the players’ directional choices. A
directional triplet, however, can exist as a NE under constraints placed on the directions allowed to
the players. This is in accordance with Eisert et al.’s result in Ref. [1] showing that a pair of unitary
transformations (Qˆ, Qˆ), where Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, π/2), exists as a NE in PD when the players’ allowed
actions are restricted to certain subsets of the set SU(2) consisting of all unitary transformations.
As is known [23, 24] that the particular subset of unitary transformations that Eisert et al.
used in order to obtain the NE of (Qˆ, Qˆ) in two-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma is not even
closed under composition. In particular, in Eisert et al.’s protocol for 2 × 2 quantum games [1],
the new Nash equilibria, and the classical-quantum transitions that occur, are the outcomes of the
particular strategy space chosen that is a two-parameter subset of single qubit unitary operators.
By choosing a different, but equally plausible, two-parameter strategy a different Nash equilibria
with different classical-quantum transitions can arise.
Using an EPR setting, and a shared GHZ state, for a three-player quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma
game, we present an approach that is driven along purely probabilistic lines with only an implicit
reference to the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, and showing the constraints on the
players’ directional choices under which a particular triplet can exist as a NE in the game.
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